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Rabbits, stoats and the predator problem: Why a strong animal rights position 
need not call for human intervention to protect prey from predators 
 
There is an issue which must be overcome with any theoretical framework which calls for the 
widespread protection of nonhuman animals, particularly those animal rights positions which 
mandate that humans adopt veg(etari)an diets as a duty of justice. This is the fact that nature, 
red in tooth and claw, involves countless relationships of predation not involving human 
agents. We must therefore confront the question of what is to be done about these 
relationships, and the individual actions of violence which necessarily follow from them. The 
problem is put starkly by environmental ethicist Mark Sagoff: 
 
If people have basic rights²and I have no doubt they do²then society has a positive 
obligation to satisfy those rights. It is not enough for society simply to refrain from 
violating them. This, surely, is true of the basic rights of animals as well, if we are to 
JLYH WKH FRQFHSWLRQ RI ³ULJKW´ WKH VDPH PHDQLQJ IRU ERWK SHRSOH DQG DQLPDOV )RU
H[DPSOHWRDOORZDQLPDOVWREHNLOOHGIRUIRRG«ZKHQLWLVZLWKLQKXPDQSRZHUWR
prevent it, does not seem to balance fairly the interests of animals with those of 
human beings. To speak of the rights of animals, of treating them as equals, of 
liberating them, and at the same time to let nearly all of them perish unnecessarily in 
the most brutal and horrible ways is not to display humanity but hypocrisy in the 
extreme. (Sagoff 1984, p. 302) 
 
The issue is not unique to environmentalism, and a similar critique is applied to animal rights 
by anti-environmentalist Tibor Machan (2004, pp. 11-2). The issue is this: from the 
perspective of a strong animal rights position, nonhuman animals should be protected by 
legally enforced rights. If they are, they have a claim to protection from aggression, meaning 
that the state has a duty to intervene to protect them from those humans who would violate 
their rights, such as recreational hunters and pastoral farmers. However, this position also 
seems to demand that the state protect nonhuman animals from their nonhuman predators, 
which is counterintuitive. The argument is presented as an informal reductio ad absurdum, 
challenging animal rights philosophy altogether (Gruen 2011, pp. 179-80; Simmons 2009, p. 
18). This leads us to our question: Can we consistently endorse an animal rights framework 
and simultaneously hold on to our intuition that the state has no duty to intervene in predator-
prey relations? The question is made more difficult by the fact that it is under-theorised in 
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animal rights literature (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, p. 157). The majority of theorists 
work to justify (or simply assume) the intuition, endorsing a hands-off approach. Martha 
1XVVEDXP E\ FRQWUDVW KDV FDXWLRXVO\ VXJJHVWHG WKDW KHU DSSURDFK GHPDQGV µWKH JUDGXDO
VXSSODQWLQJRIWKHQDWXUDOE\WKHMXVW¶1XVVEDXPSS-400); however, her position 
LV VRPHZKDW DPELJXRXV DV VKH FRQVLGHUV µPRUDOO\ UHSXJQDQW¶ D NLQG RI µEHQHYROHQW
GHVSRWLVP¶RIKXPDQVRYHUQRQKXPDQV1XVVEDXPS 
 
Contrary to the possibility of any kind of benevolent despotism, I suggest that the intuition 
against managing nature to limit the rights-violation of prey animals is not undermined by a 
strong animal rights position, but that previous thinkers have defended this intuition for poor 
reasons. This is not to say that notions of animal rights would have to be abandoned were the 
intuition inconsistent with animal rights philosophy. It is possible that it is our intuition that 
should be abandoned. As I will argue, however, we do not need to abandon our intuition or 
animal rights philosophy. In this paper, I will consider three problematic responses to the 
predator problem. First, Peter Singer argues that we should not intervene to protect prey from 
predators because such intervention in leads to negative outcomes. Second, Sue Donaldson 
DQG :LOO .\POLFND DUJXH WKDW UHVSHFWLQJ µVRYHUHLJQ¶ JURXSV RI QRQKXPDQ DQLPDOV HQWDLOV
allowing them power to decide how to live, which may include living in ways that we 
consider mistaken. Third, Alasdair Cochrane argues that certain predators are only able to 
survive by killing prey, and that this can be used to justify a policy of non-interference. 
Having rejected these possible conceptualisations, I shall revisit the classic animal rights 
answer that nonhuman predators, as they are not moral agents, cannot violate rights. I shall 
argue that, when understood in an appropriately nuanced way, this answer can actually 
overcome the predator problem, and is not defeated by the counterarguments sometimes 
offered. 
 
,QRUGHUWRH[SORUHWKLVTXHVWLRQ,DPJRLQJWRPDNHUHIHUHQFHWRWKHILFWLWLRXVµ5DEELW,VOH¶
This island, we shall assume, was once the end of a peninsula, but changing tidal patterns and 
erosion separated it from the mainland. The island takes its name from the population of 
rabbits who had lived on the peninsula and now inhabit the island. So characterful are they 
that local humans are concerned for their welfare and camp on the island to watch them and 
VSHQGWLPHDURXQGWKHPUHVSHFWIXOO\WKH\DUHFDUHIXOQRWWRLQWHUIHUHLQWKHUDEELWV¶OLYHVRQ
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a day-to-day basis. It quickly becomes apparent, however, that the rabbits are not alone. 
Another group of former peninsula inhabitants also now live on the island; a family of stoats, 
who feast upon the many rabbits. The populations are well balanced, ecologically. There is 
enough grass for the rabbits to eat, but not so many rabbits that the grass will be completely 
depleted. Further, there are enough rabbits for the stoats to eat, but not so many stoats that the 
rabbits will be exterminated. The problem is this: given that the stoats inflict pain upon and 
kill the rabbits, and given that the enlightened local community of humans recognises that the 
rabbits possess rights, the community would seemingly have an obligation to intervene to 
protect the rabbits from the stoats. This, however, is counterintuitive. 
 
Peter Singer and consequentialism 
One objection to the possibility of intervention is the simply that our calculations are fallible, 
meaning we may cause more harm than good when we intervene. When asked, it is this kind 
of answer that Peter Singer gives (Singer 2006), though he has written little about the topic. 
This approach, which I shall label consequentialist non-interventionism, clearly has some 
merit, and cases of mismanagement are not hard to come by; Donaldson and Kymlicka cite a 
case of mass-culling, supposedly in the interests of conservation, when the choice to cull was 
based upon an inaccurate model of static populations, not taking into account natural patterns 
of population growth and decline (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, p. 163). Any kind of 
human intervention in natural ecosystems is going to be fraught with difficulty, and there are 
going to be many variables which must be considered if the intervention is to be responsible. 
But this conclusion does not prove that we should never intervene in natural ecosystems. Let 
us look to Rabbit Isle. Two possible kinds of intervention follow. The first anticipates horrific 
storms in the next few months; local campaigning groups fear for both the rabbit and stoat 
populations of Rabbit Isle, and so petition local government for the creation of a wave-
EUHDNHURQ5DEELW,VOH¶VFRDVW:LWKRXWLWWKH\VD\H[SRVHGUDEELWVDQGVWRDWVZLOOEHZDVKHG
away, and those in burrows will be flushed out or drowned due to the volume of water which 
will be thrown over the island. The campaigners argue that this intervention is required; any 
other approach would show a callous disregard for the lives of the mammals on Rabbit Isle. 
However, the campaigners do not get the last word. It is easy to imagine that a rival campaign 
group, concerned with the marine life in the waters surrounding Rabbit Isle, would oppose 
the introduction of wave-breakers, as they will disrupt and kill sea creatures, in turn 
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disrupting those seabirds who feed upon them. There may also be unforeseen consequences; 
imagine a fragile coastal ecosystem local to Rabbit Isle which houses rare toads. The wave-
breaker could affect tidal patterns or push seabirds towards the coastal ecosystem, either of 
which could adversely affect the toads. This kind of large-scale intervention could have 
adverse consequences, and could easily be opposed on the grounds of human fallibility, 
despite its initial plausibility and attractiveness. 
 
The second intervention is proposed during an extremely hot summer. Rabbit Isle, let us 
assume, is actually a hostile habitat for mammals because of the lack of fresh water. After 
weeks of hot weather, locals are deeply concerned about the lack of fresh water on Rabbit 
Isle; the people who run the campsite have confirmed that the areas often filled with puddles 
have dried up, and the only fresh water on the island can be found in a small pool at the 
centre. Further, it seems that no inhabitant of the island, stoat or rabbit, knows of any further 
supply, as all are routinely travelling to the remaining pond to drink; this fact, combined with 
the warm, dry weather, is causing the pond to rapidly deplete. In response to the concern, the 
local council proposes the following modest measure: a small amount of water shall be taken 
from an abundant source (say, a local reservoir) and transferred to Rabbit Isle, where most 
shall be deposited in the central pond, and the remainder shall be sprayed in key rabbit 
feeding areas to promote plant growth. However, measures shall be taken to avoid side-
effects; first, local conservationist groups have already studied the occurrence of microscopic 
and near-PLFURVFRSLF RUJDQLVPV LQ 5DEELW ,VOH¶V FHQWUDO SRQG DQG VR FDUH FDQ EH WDNHQ WR
ensure that there shall be no inadvertent introductions which could affect the local ecosystem. 
Second, the water can easily be collected and carried by vehicles which routinely travel in the 
area; no large boats or lorries will have to be used. Third, the presence of humans on the 
island will provide no shock to the local ecosystem, as, already, conscientious humans 
habituate the island. A group of experts conclude that they are able to provide water to Rabbit 
Isle with near-certainty that this will not affect the ecosystem in any way beyond preventing 
it from breaking down due to lack of water. 
 
Consequentialist non-interventionists are here faced with a stark choice. We can say with 
moderate certainty that, unless this small and carefully managed intervention is made, all the 
rabbits and stoats on Rabbit Isle will die. In this case, Singer would surely support 
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intervention; it is particular interventions which are problematic, not interventions per se. 
Before continuing, it is worth considering and rejecting two possible reasons why a 
consequentialist non-interventionist may nonetheless insist against intervention in the case of 
the hot summer. Singer would make neither of these arguments, but a consequentialist non-
interventionist need not be a consequentialist in the broader sense; more deontological 
WKHRULVW WRR FRXOG EH ZRUULHG DERXW µclumsy human manipulation of complex natural 
UHODWLRQV¶ 6YlUG  S  ZKLOH D IHPLQLVW WKHRULVW PLJKW ZDUQ DJDLQVW µHSLVWHPLF
KXEULV¶*UXHQS)LUVWWKHFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWQRQ-interventionist may appeal to a 
certain aesthetic value in allowing the rabbits and stoats to die of thirst, and thus to destroy 
the current faunal ecosystem of Rabbit Isle. This is intuitively deeply problematic; surely, any 
DHVWKHWLFYDOXHRIIHUHGE\5DEELW,VOH¶VIDXQDH[LVWVLQWKHLUUHODWLRQVKLSDQGVXUYLYDOQRWLQ
their complete destruction. Further, we would not be equally ready to appreciate the 
DHVWKHWLFV RU IDVFLQDWLQJ LQHYLWDELOLW\ RI WKH GHDWK RI 5DEELW ,VOH¶V LQKDELWDQWV ZHUH WKH\
simple-living retirees. Were the water tanks of a small community of pensioners on the island 
to have run dry, anybody opposed to providing water would be looked upon as unjustifiably 
FDOORXV 7KLV UHVSRQVH WKHQ ZRXOG EH D JRRG H[DPSOH RI 6DJRII¶V REVHUYDWLRQ DERXW WKH
different ways that human and nonhuman rights are respected (Sagoff 1984, p. 302). The 
second argument to the consequentialist non-interventionist would be an appeal to 
scepticism; no matter how many studies are completed and meetings held concerning 
transporting reservoir water to Rabbit Isle, we still cannot be certain of the consequences of 
intervention. There are too many possible variables, and too many reasons why it may not 
result in what was expected. This objection, too, is deeply problematic, as it seems that the 
same objection could apply equally to intervention in anything. For example, a doctor cannot 
know with certainty that putting a broken leg in a cast will alleviate suffering; perhaps the 
patient will come to feel invincible, and so engage in injurious activities which she would not 
have otherwise. Whenever we consider intervening in anything, there is a possibility that our 
intervention will not have the intended effect, as there are always going to be variables that 
we have not fully considered. To claim that, therefore, we should never intervene is 
ludicrous. I conclude that the consequentialist non-interventionist could not reasonably 
oppose taking water to Rabbit Isle. 
 
If the consequentialist non-interventionist argument applies only to certain interventions 
which would, or could, result in greater loss of life or greater suffering than non-intervention, 
then in principle there must be cases, such as transporting water, in which intervention will be 
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favoured. However, once this kind of smaller-scale intervention is permitted, there is no 
reason that larger interventions may not also be permitted, in principle. These larger 
interventions would require intricately careful planning, but, with successful planning, such 
interventionist strategies could be implemented. There is no reason that this could not 
include, eventually, a complete restructuring of nature, abolishing predator-prey relations. 
Aaron Simmons, who defends consequentialist non-interventionism, is willing to bite this 
EXOOHW +H ZULWHV WKDW LI DQ\RQH µcan show that there are ways to save wild animals from 
predators on a large scale without causing ecological catastrophe, then this would suggest that 
ZH GR KDYH D GXW\ WR VDYH ZLOG DQLPDOV IURP SUHGDWRUV¶ 6LPPRQV  S  This 
conclusion feels weak, and, seemingly, misses the point (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, p. 
164), at least insofar as it does not vindicate animal rights philosophy (or animal ethics more 
broadly) from the reductio. The argument will gradually fall away; as we learn more about 
ecosystems, we are going to find ourselves closer to a situation in which we can predict the 
outcomes of interventions with more and more certainty. In the case of a relatively small and 
self-contained ecosystem, such as Rabbit Isle, it is not implausible that close and careful 
study by a variety of scientists could teach us enough that large-scale intervention might be 
possible with near-certainty of the results. Indeed, we may be able to approach this kind of 
intervention equal or greater certainty as with interventions in, for example, education or 
public health ± interventions governments make regularly. 
 
There is a further issue with this approach, particularly for those thinkers who are 
consequentialists more broadly. It is a given that predation causes horrific suffering for the 
prey, and so this sort of predation must be a concern for the consequentialist, who cannot 
simply choose to ignore certain kinds of suffering. I have shown that the consequentialist 
opposes interventions in predator-prey relationships only because of our insufficient 
knowledge of ecology. These two facts would seemingly implore the consequentialist to 
demand immediate funding into the study of ecosystems precisely so we might one day 
intervene successfully (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, p. 164; Horta 2013, p. 121); at the 
very least (perhaps there are most cost-effective methods of reducing suffering), this should 
be an option given ample consideration. For the consequentialist, if we are able, we must 
work towards minimising all suffering. Perhaps we could start small, with intensive studies 
of the likes of Rabbit Isle, before building up to more complex and isolated ecosystems. 
Oscar Horta (2013) endorses this kind of approach, though his examples of small-scale 
interventions do not include protecting predators from prey; presumably, however, this is 
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something he could support in the long term. I conclude that consequentialist non-
interventionism cannot justify our intuition that intervention in predator-prey relationships is 
not necessary, and so cannot be used to defend animal rights philosophy from the challenge 
of the predator problem. 
 
Zoopolis and sovereignty 
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka offer a distinctive account of our relationship to 
nonhuman animals, and, in so doing, offer a distinctive answer to the question of human 
intervention in predator-prey relationships. They argue that those nonhuman animals who live 
free from human dependency (whether in the sense that companions are dependent or the 
sense that city-dwelling pigeons are dependent) should be granted sovereignty, in the same 
way that autonomous groups of humans should be. Drawing upon the words of Jo-Anne 
Pemberton (2009), the authors explain that 
 
Like stateless human communities, [nonhuman animal communities] may lack the 
concept of sovereignty and may lack the sort of institutional differentiation that 
VHSDUDWHV³VWDWH´IURP³VRFLHW\´%XWOLNHKXPDQFRPPXQLWLHVWKH\FDQQRWEH³VHHQ
in good faith, as mere numerical quantities, bereft of social organisation and 
UHFRJQLVDEOH LQWHUHVWV´ 7KH\ WRR KDYH DQ ³LQGHSHQGHQW H[LVWHQFH´ DQG KDYH
demonstrated the value they attach to it by resisting alien rule. Like human 
FRPPXQLWLHV WKHLU ³FRPPXQDO IORXULVKLQJ´ GHSHQGV RQ VHFXULQJ WKHLU ODQGV DQG
autonomy. (Indeed, the extent to which their well-being depends on maintaining 
specific traditional habitats is arguably greater for most wild animals than for 
KXPDQV +HQFH WKH\ WRR VKRXOG EH VHHQ DV EHLQJ ³HQWLWOHG WR EH OHIW DORQH´
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, p. 174) 
 
The authors certainly do not take an absolutist position. They expand upon situations in 
which human intervention in nonhuman communities is necessary as a matter of justice. 
+RZHYHU WKH\DUJXH WKDWFRQFHUQLQJµWKHGD\-to-GD\PDQDJHPHQW¶RIKRZQRQKXPDQV OLYH
and survive, they should be viewed as competent and capable, and so humans should not 
LQWHUYHQH'RQDOGVRQDQG.\POLFNDS7KLVLQFOXGHVDOORZLQJWKHPµWKHULJKWWR
PDNHPLVWDNHVDQG WR IROORZSDWKV WKDWRXWVLGHUVPLJKWVHHDVPLVJXLGHG¶'RQDOGVRQDQG
Kymlicka 2013, p. 171). As such, the authors would conceptualise Rabbit Isle as an 
independent state, and argue that we have a moral duty to leave the rabbits and the stoats to 
their own devices, even if we consider their actions to be misguided or morally problematic. 
To do otherwise would be to violDWH WKH DQLPDOV¶ ULJKW WR VRYHUHLJQW\ RYHU WKHLU RZQ
community. 
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An immediate problem becomes clear. As the authors accept, among humans, we do 
UHFRJQLVH WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI µOHJLWLPDWH H[WHUQDO LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ WKH FDVH RI IDLOHG VWDWHV RU
JURVV « ULJKWV YLRODWLRQV¶ 'RQDOGVRQ DQG .\POLFND  S  +RUWD FRUUHFWO\ QRWHV
that, if Donaldson and Kymlicka are right to call free-living animal communities statesµPRVW
animals in the wild are living in irretrievably failed states incapable of ever being 
tranVIRUPHGLQWRVRYHUHLJQFRPPXQLWLHV WKDW UHVSHFW WKHLUPHPEHUV¶ LQWHUHVWV¶ +RUWD
SHPSKDVLV+RUWD¶V$KXPDQDQDORJXHRI5DEELW ,VOHZRXOGEHDVWDWH OHWXVFDOO LW
Husbandria, in which a large population of farmers (the rabbits) live peacefully but in 
constant fear of marauders (the stoats). The marauders would survive solely from raiding 
farming communities, where they would freely kill the farmers. The marauders survive in 
YLUWXHRI WKHIDUPHUV¶ LQDELOLW\ WR ILJKWEDFNDQG WKHIDFW WKDW+XVbandria never runs out of 
farmers, though nearly all are violently killed. The international community would rightly be 
appalled at such a state; there is no central authority, or, if there is, it is powerless to stop 
widespread and systematic violence against citizens. Such a state would be declared failed, 
and the international community would be morally (and perhaps politically or legally) 
obligated to step in to protect the farmers. If we are obligated to protect the farmers of 
Husbandria, it is unclear why we are not obligated to protect the rabbits of Rabbit Isle. 
Donaldson and Kymlicka have a rather unsatisfactory answer. Anticipating this objection, 
they write that 
 
If a human community failed [to protect its citizens], we would likely view it as a 
³IDLOHGVWDWH´RULQDQ\HYHQWRQHWKDWUHTXLUHVVRPHGHJUHHRIH[WHUQDOLQWHUYHQWLRQ
But in the context of ecosystems, food cycles and predator-prey relationships are not 
LQGLFDWRUVRI³IDLOXUH´5DWKHUWKH\DUHGHILQLQJIHDWXUHVRIWKHFRQWH[WZLWKLQZhich 
wild animal communities exist; they frame the challenges to which wild animals must 
respond both individually and collectively, and the evidence suggests that they 
respond competently. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, p. 176) 
 
This is similar to an earlier argument offered, in a slightly different context, by Jennifer 
(YHUHWW6KHZULWHVWKDWUHVSHFWIXOWUHDWPHQWµUHTXLUHVWKDWHDFKVXEMHFW-of-a-life be treated in 
DPDQQHU WKDW LV UHVSHFWIXORI WKDWFUHDWXUH¶VQDWXUHZKHUH WKLV LQFOXGHVERWKFKDUDFWHULVWic 
IDFWVDERXWPHPEHUVRILWVNLQGDQGWKHWUDLWVLWSRVVHVVHVDVDXQLTXHLQGLYLGXDO¶$VVXFK
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µPRUDO DJHQWV KDYH prima facie duties to assist them only insofar as such assistance is 
necessary as a matter of course for those creatures to flourish accordiQJ WR WKHLU QDWXUH¶
(Everett 2001, p. 54). This view is rightly criticised by Rainer Ebert and Tibor Machan as 
µERWK F\QLFDO DQG VSHFLHVLVW ,W LV F\QLFDO DQG LPSODXVLEOH WR VXJJHVW WKDW EHLQJ ULSSHG WR
SLHFHVE\DOLRQLVFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKHZLOGHEHHVW¶VÀRXULVKLQJZKLOHEHLQJVDYHGE\DPRUDO
DJHQWLVQRW¶(EHUWDQG0DFKDQSVHHIXUWKHU+DGOH\SS-9) Similarly, 
the response of Donaldson and Kymlicka is unsatisfying. Returning to Husbandria, the 
marauders might understand their rHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHIDUPHUVDVDµGHILQLQJIHDWXUH¶RIOLIH
in the nation. The farmers may even shrug their shoulders philosophically and agree. 
)XUWKHUPRUH +XVEDQGULD¶V IDUPHUV VXUYLYH JHQHUDWLRQ WR JHQHUDWLRQ HYHQ LI PRVW DUH
eventually murdered, and VR µUHVSRQGFRPSHWHQWO\¶ WR WKHFRQVWDQW WKUHDW LQ WKHVDPHZD\
WKDW WKH UDEELWV RI 5DEELW ,VOH µUHVSRQG FRPSHWHQWO\¶ WR VWRDW DWWDFNV 1RQH RI WKLV ZRXOG
mean that we have no obligation to intervene in Husbandria, and so it is difficult to see how it 
could mean that we have no obligation in the case of Rabbit Isle. A second argument that 
'RQDOGVRQ DQG .\POLFND RIIHU LV WKDW QRQKXPDQ DQLPDOV KDYH µYRWHG ZLWK WKHLU IHHW¶ LQ
choosing to live away from humans (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, p. 177). Given the 
history of human/nonhuman interactions, this is hardly surprising. Perhaps something similar 
LVWUXHZLWK+XVEDQGULD¶VIDUPHUVSHUKDSVWKH\IOHGIURPWKHVXUURXQGLQJVWDWHVEHFDXVHWKH\
faced persecution in the past, being allowed no space to farm, and being treated as second-
class citizens. This would not justify the surrounding states choosing to leave them to suffer 
at the hands of the marauders. Indeed, quite the opposite. I conclude that even treating Rabbit 
Isle as a separate sovereign state would not justify refusal to protect the rabbits from the 
stoats. 
 
There exists a further problem with the response from Donaldson and Kymlicka. This is the 
fact that they understand sovereignty as closely tied to territory, conceiving of nonhuman 
animal states as µPXOWL-VSHFLHVDQLPDOHFRORJLHV¶'RQDOGVRQDQG.\POLFNDSS-1). 
It is not clear why we should conceptualise the stoats and the rabbits as belonging to the same 
nation, unless we begin with the assumption that we should not be interfering in ecosystems, 
which is to beg the question. It seems it would make just as much sense to conceptualise the 
rabbits of Rabbit Isle as one state and the stoats of Rabbit Isle as another; if we did this, then, 
clearly, we would have a situation in which one small and aggressive state was inflicting 
violence upon a peaceful state, with no sign of an end. Were these human states, we would 
This is a reformatted version of the author accepted version of a paper published in Res Publica. For the final 
version of the paper, please consult the journal. 
have a clear responsibility to protect the peaceful state from the smaller state. The situation is 
inherently stacked against the rabbits when we assume that they are part of the same state as 
the stoats. Certainly, it is difficult to see how the stoats and the rabbits form a single 
community; Donaldson and Kymlicka partially justify the claim of nonhuman animal 
sovereignty by making reference to the, often interspecies, collaborative efforts of free-living 
animals (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, pp. 175-6). There is no such peaceful and 
meaningful interaction between the rabbits and the stoats of Rabbit Isle (see further Horta 
2013). I conclude, therefore, that the hands-off approach cannot be justified by an appeal to 
sovereignty, and it is unclear why we should consider the stoats and rabbits to be a part of the 
same community in the first place. 
 
Cochrane and killing for survival 
Alasdair Cochrane offers an alternative response to the predator problem. He suggests that 
µ>L@WLVSRVVLEOHWRGHQ\SUH\DQLPDOVDULJKWQRWWREHNLOOHGE\SUHGDWRUVZKHQLWLVQRWHGWKDW
SUHGDWRU DQLPDOV QHHG WR NLOO IRU VXUYLYDO¶ &RFKUDQH  S  +e is concerned with 
differentiating, for instance, human/chicken relations from rabbit/stoat relations. The 
difference, he claims, is that humans are able to survive without killing chickens (or any other 
animal) to eat their flesh, but that predators are unable to survive without killing their prey; as 
such, we must choose between the life of the predator and the life of the prey. Given that, on 
WKH ZKROH LW LV JRLQJ WR EH PRUH µEXUGHQVRPH¶ IRU XV WR LQWHUYHQH WKDQ QRW LQWHUYHQH ZH
VKRXOG µDGRSW D JHQHUDO SROLF\ RI QRQLQWHUIHUHQFH¶ &RFKUDQH  S 1 I challenge 
&RFKUDQH¶V DUJXPHQW RQ WZR JURXQGV )LUVW KH KROGV WKDW VWRDWV DJHQWV EXW QRW PRUDO
agents) are able to violate rights. I do not accept this claim; if I pick up a baby, and she 
proceeds to bite me, we would not say that she had violated my rights. The same if I picked 
up a stoat, and she bit me. By extension, a baby or stoat who killed a rabbit would not violate 
WKH UDEELW¶V ULJKWV &RFKUDQH¶V UHDVRQV IRU UHMHFWLQJ P\ SRVLWLRQ ZLOO EH GLVFussed shortly. 
6HFRQG &RFKUDQH¶V DUJXPHQW UHVWV XSRQ D TXHVWLRQDEOH HPSLULFDO FODLP 7KH LVVXH LV WKLV
can predatory nonhuman animals survive on diets that do not entail them killing any rights-
                                                          
1
  This presumably means that Cochrane would hold that, in those cases where it was not more 
µEXUGHQVRPH¶ IRU XV WR LQWHUYHQH WKDQ WR QRW LQWHUYHQH ZH ZRXOG KDYH D GXW\ RI LQWHUYHQWLRQ +H GRHV QRW
expand upon this point, but it would likely mean that, for instance, we could intervene to spare a child the 
unhappiness of seeing a rabbit killed by a stoat. This does not seem unreasonable, provided the stoat could be 
interfered with in a way that respected her rights. 
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bearing animal? In one sense, the answer is obviously yes. If I were to care for a ferret 
companion (a close relative of a stoat) then, even if I were to feed her an entirely animal-
based diet, she could live a flourishing, healthy life having never killed another animal. This 
UHVSRQVHWDNHV&RFKUDQH¶VZRUGVWRROLterally. What is of concern is whether any animals are 
killed so that my companion may eat, not specifically whether she killed them. There are two 
approaches we could take to ensure that no rights-bearing animals are killed for the ferret to 
eat. First, we could seek a way that my companion could survive without ingesting animal 
protein; could my ferret be a vegan? It is well-documented that dogs can thrive on 
appropriate vegan diets, and it is possible that cats can (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013, p. 
149), but ferrets, it seems, cannot (PETA [undated]). It is perhaps not impossible that further 
research into the question will find otherwise, but I shall assume for the purposes of this 
DUJXPHQWWKDWERWKFRPSDQLRQIHUUHWVDQG5DEELW,VOH¶VVWRDWVDUHXQDEOHWo survive on vegan 
diets. 
 
I shall instead turn to the second approach. This is to find a way that wholly carnivorous 
animals could, in principle, live upon an animal-based diet which do not necessitate the 
killing of any rights-bearing animals. There are several ways that this could be possible: 
µVFDYHQJHG¶FRUSVHVµIUDQNHQPHDW¶SURGXFHGIURPVWHPFHOOVDQGJHQXLQHO\HWKLFDOHJJVDUH
considered by Donaldson and Kymlicka (2013, p. 150). A fourth possibility is that meat 
could be produced from non-sentient DQLPDOV WHFKQRORJLFDO VROXWLRQV LQFOXGH µNQRFNRXW
OLYHVWRFN¶ *DUQHU  S  VHH IXUWKHU 6KULYHU  RU JHQHWLFDOO\ HQJLQHHUHG
anencephalic animals (McMahan 2002, pp. 450-5). However, we could also harvest animal 
protein from animals which are already non-sentient. Perhaps certain bivalves, arthropods or 
echinoderms, for instance, are non-sentient, and thus could be harvested (or farmed) for the 
production of animal protein to feed carnivores, such as ferret companions. On Rabbit Isle, 
local enthusiasts could acquire these foodstuffs, scattering them around the homes of the 
stoats. These possibilities demonstrate that, at least in principle, the stoats of Rabbit Isle 
could be fed without rights violations. This means that the decision does not come down to 
the choice between violating the rights of predators and violating the rights of prey, as 
Cochrane suggests. There may be a third choice, in which the rights of no party are violated. 
While it does seem reasonable that Cochrane endorse the less burdensome of intervention and 
non-intervention, given that both (within his framework) involve rights violations, it is less 
clear that he could appeal to the weight of the burden when he can choose between three 
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courses of action, one of which involves no rights violations at all. This is especially true 
given the fact that he (rightly) already demands that we begin to make burdensome changes 
to our societies and lifestyles in order to protect the rights of nonhuman animals. The 
dichotomy that Cochrane has drawn, based upon the claim that predators need to kill for their 
survival, seems to be a false one, and so I conclude that his argument in favour of non-
intervention fails. 
 
Moral agency revisited 
The classic animal rights response to the predator problem comes from Tom Regan, who 
argues that nonhuman predators are not moral agents, and so they cannot violate the rights of 
another being, whether a moral agent or a moral patient (Regan 1984, p. 285; see further 
Linzey 2009, p. 84). This means that, as the rights of the prey animals are not being violated, 
no appeal to their rights can justify intervention. While this is broadly the account I endorse, I 
suggest that it is dissatisfying un-nuanced. The question of moral agency in relation to the 
predator problem was recently developed further by Ebert and Machan.2 The authors 
H[SOLFDWH ZRUULHV ZLWK DSSDUHQW LQFRQVLVWHQFLHV LQ 5HJDQ¶V DFFRXQW DQG ZLWK WKH WURXEOLQJ
conclusion that we have no duties to save other humans from innocent threats. They instead 
propose DµOLEHUWDULDQL]DWLRQ¶RIDQLPDOULJKWVWKHRU\H[SODLQLQJWKDW 
 
Libertarian justice does not require us to assist others whose rights are being violated. 
Therefore, it is prima facie not morally wrong not to do what will harm the lion in 
scenarios A and B, in which a lion is preying on a small child and a wildebeest, 
respectively. However, there is room for special duties to the child generated by his or 
her special relationship to moral agents. These people with special duties might be the 
FKLOG¶VSDUHQWV or the members of the human society he or she lives in or a part of this 
society like his or her school or church or state. In scenario A, there hence might well 
be moral agents who have the special duty to assist the child against the attack of the 
lion, but no duty to assist the wildebeest in scenario B. Note that this is not speciesist 
and [is] consistent with the claim that the child and the wildebeest possess equal 
PRUDOULJKWV,QIDFWLIWKHZLOGHEHHVWZDVVD\VRPHERG\¶VDQLPDOFRPSDQLRQWKHUH
might be special duties directed towards the wildebeest, too. (Ebert and Machan 2012, 
p. 155) 
 
                                                          
2
  Like Cochrane, however, the authors hold that agents, as opposed to moral agents, can violate rights. 
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This account begins to look plausible, but remains problematic. First, while we as individuals 
may not possess a duty to protect the rights of others, the state surely has a duty to protect the 
rights of those within its borders. (This protection may include passing laws to mandate 
intervention from citizens.) Second, the inference that we have a duty to protect children from 
lions only because of our relationship with the child is questionable. If we came across a 
child with whom we had no relationship, protecting them from a lion would surely remain a 
necessity if it cost us little; unless the authors are prepared to endorse a claim that we have a 
significant relationship and association with all humans, a claim that looks suspiciously 
speciesist, then they would have to allow that watching some children be mauled by lions is 
completely just, even if we could prevent the attack without any harm to ourselves or the lion. 
Third, while there is clearly something right about an obligation to protect young children 
and companions, this need not come from a relationship we have with them. 
 
Contra Ebert and Machan, I suggest that we need not reject the necessity of intervention in 
rights-YLRODWLRQVWRRYHUFRPHWKHSUHGDWRUSUREOHP,QVWHDGZHFDQGHYHORS5HJDQ¶VDFFRXQW
in a new way, giving it a degree of nuance lacking in the original exposition. I suggest that a 
ZROI LV QRW D PRUDO DJHQW DQG VR D ZROI¶V NLOOLQJ RI D GHer in isolated woodland does not 
violate the rights of the deer, any more than the rights of the deer would be violated were she 
instead crushed by a tree. Crucially, however, the question of whether something is the 
responsibility of a moral agent is a matter of degree.3 :HUHWKHZROI¶VNLOOLQJRIWKHGHHUWR
WDNH SODFH LQ D ]RR WKHQ WKH GHHU¶V ULJKWV would have been violated, but the human 
]RRNHHSHUVZKRSODFHGKHULQWKHZROI¶VHQFORVXUHZRXOGEHUHVSRQVLEOHUDWKHUWKDQWKHZROI
herself. Consider a secRQGH[DPSOH:KLOHDZLOGFDW¶VNLOOLQJRIDPRXVHGRHVQRWYLRODWHWKH
PRXVH¶VULJKWVDFRPSDQLRQFDW¶VNLOOLQJRIDPRXVHLVWRDFHUWDLQH[WHQWWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\
of the humans who have permitted the killing; we should be considered guilty for violating 
the rights of a mouse when she is killed, as the cat is part of our society, and is (successfully) 
hunting because of our actions. So, in response to Sagoff ± and assuming he is talking about a 
companion cat ± ZH GR LQGHHG KDYH DQ REOLJDWLRQ µWR SUHYHQW D FDW IURP NLOOLQJ D PRXVH¶
(Sagoff 1984, p. 301). In this case, it is true that careless cat-keeping humans (or societies) 
                                                          
3
  It is true, and worth remembering, that moral agents sometimes cause things for which they are not 
responsible. Neither drivers nor the state are responsible for accidental deaths on the road, provided drivers are 
cautious, and the state takes necessary precautions to prevent them. Provided a certain precautions are taken, no 
one is responsible for deaths on the road, and it is wrong to say that such accidental deaths involve rights-
violations. If they nonetheless remain issues of justice, it is not because of the rights of victims. 
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are less morally responsible for the death of the mouse that if they were to kill her 
themselves. Despite this, the rights of the mouse are still being violated, and the mouse has a 
FODLPWRKDYHKHUULJKWVSURWHFWHGE\VRFLHW\7RWDNH(EHUWDQG0DFKDQ¶VH[DPSOHWKHULJKWV
of a wildebeest are not normally violated when she is hunted by a lion. However, when we 
see a human child being hunted by a lion, the rights of the human child have been violated by 
the person or persons who have left her in or forced her (perhaps through negligence) into 
this environment. The child, therefore, has a claim to protection from society in a way that 
WKHZLOGHEHHVWQRUPDOO\ZRXOGQRWHYHQLIWKHWZREHLQJV¶ULJKWVDUHRWKHUZLVHHTXLYDOHQW 
 
This more nuanced understanding of moral responsibility overcomes the objection raised by 
Cochrane to this defence of a hands-off approach to intervention. Following Peter Alward 
(2000, p. 83; see further Everett 2001, p. 51 and Jamieson 1990), Cochrane uses the thought 
experiment of a toddler who has come upon a knife and, not realising what he is doing, is 
DERXWWRVOLWKLVVOHHSLQJIDWKHU¶VWKURDW7KHFKLOGLVQot a moral agent, and so could not be 
blamed for his action (Cochrane 2012, p. 92); consequently, the child would not violate the 
ULJKWVRIKLVIDWKHULQKLVDFWLRQVLIZHIROORZ5HJDQ¶VDFFRXQW'HVSLWHWKLV&RFKUDQHZDQWV
WRVD\WKDWWKHFKLOG¶VPRWKHU4 were she watching, would be obliged to step in to prevent the 
FKLOG IURP VOLWWLQJ KLV IDWKHU¶V WKURDW GXH WR WKH ULJKWV RI WKH IDWKHU :KLOH WKLV PD\ EH D
plausible criticism of Regan, I suggest that we can allow a rights-based duty of intervention 
in this case while also GHQ\LQJ WKH VXJJHVWLRQ WKDW WKHEDE\ FDQYLRODWH WKH IDWKHU¶V ULJKWV
Importantly, there is some moral agent who is blameworthy in this situation; whoever is 
responsible for the child acquiring a knife. Whether or not she is to blame, the watching 
mother has a duty to protect the rights of the sleeping father, assuming it is not too onerous 
for her.5 $VVXFK,VXJJHVWWKDWP\DFFRXQWLVDEOHWRWDNH5HJDQ¶VDSSURDFKRIGHQ\LQJWKDW
moral patients can violate rights while avoiding the conclusion that the mother has no duty to 
intervene. I accept that, under this developed account, intervention would not be necessary in 
                                                          
4
  If we are troubled by the idea that the mother has a duty to intervene to prevent rights violations, she 
can be replaced for the purposes of the thought experiment with a police officer or other agent of the state tasked 
with preventing rights violations. Even if the mother need not protect the rights of others, the state must. 
5
  There is perhaps one exception to this; a person cannot violate their own rights. As such, were the 
IDWKHUUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHFKLOG¶VKDYLQJWKHNQLIHWKHPRWKHUZRXOGQRt have a duty to intervene to protect the 
IDWKHU¶VULJKWV6KHZRXOGDVLWKDSSHQVVWLOOKDYHDGXW\WRLQWHUYHQHDVSODFLQJDFKLOGLQDVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFK
he can pick up a sharp knife quite clearly violates his rights; the child, deeply dependent on his carers, has a 
right not to be put in an unsafe environment. Further, we may wish to allow some other duty (through, say, an 
appeal to virtue) to encourage her to intervene on behalf of the father. This would not, however, be a duty 
mandated by the rights of the father, and so is unimportant for the purposes of this argument 
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a case in which a man brazenly marches towards a very deep pit, or, if it was, it would not be 
due to any rights of the man. Assuming that society has not violated any right he may have to 
be informed about potential threats, no one would have a compulsion to protect his rights by 
preventing him from entering the hole, as no rights would be violated. We may wish to say 
that it is a callous person who does not prevent him from entering the pit, but, importantly, 
WKHUHLVQRGXW\RIMXVWLFHJURXQGHGLQWKHPDQ¶VULJKWVWRLQWHUYHQH,GRQRWIHHOWKDWWKLVLVD
difficult bullet to bite, especially as my account is able to overcome the more problematic 
challenge presented by Cochrane. 
 
Dale Jamieson would likely object to this more careful account of moral responsibility, 
claiming that while it may provide somewhat intuitive answers in the case of protecting prey 
from their predators, it still encounters problems with putative rights violations caused by 
phenomena or entities which are neither moral agents nor moral patients. He constructs an 
argument against Regan involving five cases in which a boulder rolls towards an 
unsuspecting male walker from the location of a female walker. The male can be saved only 
E\WKHUHDGHU¶VVKRXW7KHGLIIHUHQFHLQHDFKFDVHLVRQO\WKHFDXVHRIWKHERXOGHU¶VPRWLRQ 
 
In Case 1 the woman intentionally pushes the boulder down the mountain toward the 
man. In Case 2 the woman takes a step, inadvertently causing the boulder to roll. In 
Case 3 the woman sneezes, and the boulder rolls toward the man as a result. In Case 4 
there is a wolf on the trail above instead of the woman. While stalking her prey, the 
wolf causes a boulder to roll down the mountain toward the man. In Case 5 the 
boulder is set in motion by a landslide. (Jamieson 1990, p. 351) 
 
Why, Jamieson asks, should we intervene in the first case but not in the others? I suggest that 
there are two ways we could look at this issue while retaining an animal rights position. First, 
it is possible that, even in the latter cases, the man is a victim of injustice; he may have been 
misled about the dangers of loose boulders, or been ignored by someone who has a duty to 
warn potential walkers. Perhaps the best we could say is that the subject of the thought 
experiment is in no position to know whether the man is a victim of a rights violation, and so 
has a weak duty of justice to intervene based on the possibility. (This duty of justice would be 
greater were the man a child or companion; both of them would likely have a legitimate claim 
against whoever placed them in, or allowed them to enter, such a dangerous environment, as 
This is a reformatted version of the author accepted version of a paper published in Res Publica. For the final 
version of the paper, please consult the journal. 
both have a right not to be neglected in this way.) The duty of justice to intervene because of 
the possibility of a rights violation would be vanishingly small were it a free-living animal in 
WKHERXOGHU¶VSDWKDVWKHOLNHOLKRRGWKDWDPRUal agent is in some way morally responsible for 
her predicament is minute. Therefore, the subject could have a small duty of justice to 
LQWHUYHQHLQWKHFDVHRIDPDQLQDERXOGHU¶VSDWKEXWQRWLQWKHFDVHRIDJRDWLQDERXOGHU¶V
path. 
 
This answer, while supporting our intuitions, is unsatisfactory. While plausible in some 
situations, it seems strange to suggest that we must intervene in every scenario like this just in 
case a right has not been respected somewhere in the series of events which has led to this 
boulder crashing towards an unsuspecting rights-bearer. It is plausible that no right has been 
violated to put the walker in the position he is, and the potential intervener knows this with 
near-certainty. What is interesting about the possibility of intervention is that it does not 
involve any interference with a rights-bearing being. As such, and this is the second possible 
response to Jamieson, while there is no rights-based duty for the subject to intervene, there is 
no rights-based duty for the subject not to intervene, either. Intervention in this case could be 
left as a matter of conscience, meaning the state would have no business in enforcing 
intervention or non-LQWHUYHQWLRQDWOHDVWQREXVLQHVVVSHFLILFDOO\GXHWRWKHZDONHU¶VULJKWV
By comparison, intervening in a single case of a wolf catching a goat might violate the rights 
of the wolf, and so we have a case, pro tanto, not to intervene.6 It is therefore plausible to 
hold that an individual has a duty of justice to protect a goat from a boulder while not having 
the same duty to protect her from a predator. Whether this conclusion belongs in any 
particular animal rights position is down to whether the account can accommodate duties of 
justice which are not grounded in rights, but, even if a given account cannot, no state would 
have any business in preventing intervention in the boulder cases, while any state respecting 
animal rights would retain a plausible reason to prevent intervention in the case of predator-
prey interactions. This illustrates a fundamental difference between intervention in the case of 
predator, and intervention in the boulder case. 
 
                                                          
6
  7KLVYLRODWLRQRIWKHZROI¶VULJKWLVWKHHTXLYDOHQWWRWKHZD\WKDWZHDVDVRFLHW\YLRODWHWKHULJKWVRI
criminals when we intervene to protect their victims, potential or actual. :KLOHWKLVYLRODWLRQRIWKHSUHGDWRU¶V
rights does not necessarily make intervention unjust, it does give us reason to pause. 
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We can now apply this developed position to Rabbit Isle. Recall that the island was created 
when the tip of a peninsula already populated by rabbits and stoats was separated from the 
mainland by a process of erosion. The rabbits and stoats continued in relationships 
established by their ancestors (who were not moral agents) in a different environment created 
by forces that can be considered neither morally responsible themselves, nor the product of 
morally responsible entities. The rabbits, then, have no claim that their rights are being 
violated, and, if humans have an obligation to intervene to protect them from the stoats, it is 
not because of the rights they possess. We can see, therefore, that our intuitions concerning 
non-intervention are justified in a philosophically robust way, and we can retain those 
intuitions while maintaining a strong animal rights position. The matter would be different 
were the relationships of violence on Rabbit Isle established in a different way. If things had 
worked out differently and no family of stoats had been on the tip of the peninsula when it 
was separated from the mainland, but locals had introduced stoats to the island, then the 
blood of the rabbits could be on the hands of the locals. The pertinent question would be the 
extent to which the locals were morally responsible for the violence inflicted on the rabbits; 
clearly, there is a difference betwHHQ YLRODWLQJ VRPHRQH¶V ULJKW DQG SODFLQJ WKHP LQ D
situation which is bad for them. If the locals introduced the stoats with the intention of killing 
the rabbits, then they would be wholly (or, at least, highly) morally responsible for their 
deaths. In this case, the rabbits would possess a claim against the locals, and we as a society 
would be responsible for protecting their rights. It is plausible, however, that locals could 
deliberately introduce stoats to the island without violating the rights of the rabbits. For 
instance, if some stoats were rescued from a local sadist who had captured them from the 
peninsula, they would have a legitimate claim against society. If keeping them captive would 
violate their rights, or, at least, releasing them would not violate their rights, then where 
better to release them than what their home has become, given as it remains a stoat-friendly 
environment? In this case, stoats could be released on Rabbit Isle without the rabbits having 
any claim against those who releasH WKHP DV LW LV RQO\ WKURXJK WKHYLRODWLRQRI WKH VWRDWV¶
rights in the first place7 that Rabbit Isle remains stoat-free. There is not space here to 
elucidate the full range of possible actions and degrees of moral responsibility, but these 
examples demonstrate that there both exist cases in which introduced stoats violate the rights 
of the rabbits and cases in which they do not. 
                                                          
7
  Even if capturing a stoat does not violate her rights, capturing her with the intention of subjecting her 
to torture surely does. 
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In closing, I will briefly deal with two potential objections to my proposed framework. One 
may object to my account because of its focus on moral responsibility, and neglect of 
UHPHGLDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ 7KLV ODWWHU FRQFHSW LQ WKH ZRUGV RI 'DYLG 0LOOHU µKDV WR GR ZLWK
DJHQWVKDYLQJDGXW\RUREOLJDWLRQWRSXWDEDGVLWXDWLRQULJKW¶0LOOHUS6XFKDQ
objector may accept that humans have no degree of moral responsibility for the death of the 
rabbits, but say that this does not preclude humans having remedial responsibility. Given that 
remedial responsibility can be assigned on the basis of those with the capacity to help and 
those who share a community with the victims (Miller 2007, pp. 100-4), local humans may 
ZHOO KDYH D GHJUHH RI UHPHGLDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR KHOS 5DEELW ,VOH¶V LQKDELWDQWV 0LOOHU¶V
DFFRXQWRIUHPHGLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\KRZHYHUEHJLQVZLWKµDVWDWHRIDIIDLUVLQQHHGRIUHPHG\¶
(Miller 2007, p. 98). Thus, to apply it to this case begs the question. Remedial responsibility 
is a useful concept only once we have established that something needs to be fixed. Under a 
pure animal rights approach, which I have defHQGHG LQ WKLV SDSHU WKHUH LV RQO\ µD VWDWH RI
DIIDLUVLQQHHGRIUHPHG\¶LIULJKWVDUHEHLQJYLRODWHG,QWKHFDVHRI5DEELW,VOHWKHUHDUHQR
rights being violated, and so questions of remedial responsibility do not arise. The second 
potential objection is related. It may be claimed that my focus upon whether rights have been 
violated in the case of predation have hidden the real question at stake ± namely, whether we 
have some kind of obligation to intervene regardless of whether rights are being violated. On 
this issue, I have remained deliberately quiet. It is not my purpose in this paper to offer a 
complete account of our positive duties to rights-bearers, or even a complete account of our 
positive duties to nonhuman animals. Instead, my aim has been to show that animal rights 
positions can consistently reject the suggestion that we are obliged to protect prey from 
predators. As a challenge to animal rights, then, the predator problem fails. 
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, our intuition that we should not intervene in the predator-prey relationship 
between the rabbits and the stoats of Rabbit Isle can be supported within a political 
framework which recognises the rights of nonhuman animals, and so animal rights 
philosophy is vindicated of the predator problem. This is because of the old argument that 
predators are not moral agents, but the old argument has to be understood in a new and more 
This is a reformatted version of the author accepted version of a paper published in Res Publica. For the final 
version of the paper, please consult the journal. 
nuanced way, allowing it to overcome key challenges. This new approach does maintain that, 
at times, intervention is morally mandated by nonhuman rights, but it is mandated only in 
those cases in which morally responsible agents can be found, and only to the degree that 
they can be found. As the vast majority of predator-prey interactions are not linked to moral 
agents in an important way, the rights of prey do not necessitate intervention. This new 
understanding has distinct advantages over the alternative approaches I have considered, and 
offers a realistic and morally viable account of how political communities should 
conceptualise the suffering of free-living animals. 
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